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Abstract 
 
The French pension system has for long been characterised by its very low 
reliance on funded pensions, which have almost become a taboo subject since the 
Second World War. While other countries have often complemented statutory 
pensions with funded occupational pension schemes, in France, the social partners 
have put in place an encompassing network of supplementary pension arrangements 
financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis. The generosity of these schemes and 
their defence by trade unions and part of the business community has considerably 
limited the room for expansion of funded pension schemes. However, the role 
played by these supplementary PAYG schemes has significantly changed over the 
last two decades. First, the gradual harmonization of rules within the different 
schemes and their compliance with EU social security regulations are leading to their 
quasi “first-pillarization”. Second, similar to statutory pensions, these schemes have 
also undergone gradual retrenchment and will offer reduced replacement rates. As a 
result, the development of pension savings has been implicitly promoted, although 
more on a voluntary basis than on a compulsory one. Despite a unification in the 
regulatory framework governing funded – occupational and personal – pension 
plans, access to these schemes remains mostly limited to high-skilled workers. 
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Introduction1 
 
The French pension system has for long been characterised by its very low 
reliance on funded pensions, which have almost become a taboo subject since the 
Second World War. While other countries have often complemented statutory 
pensions with funded occupational pension schemes, in France, the social partners 
have put in place an encompassing network of supplementary pension arrangements 
financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis. The generosity of these schemes and 
their defence by trade unions and part of the business community have considerably 
limited the room for expansion of funded pension schemes. However, the role 
played by these supplementary PAYG schemes has significantly changed over the 
last two decades. First, the gradual harmonization of rules within the different 
schemes and their compliance with EU social security regulations are leading to their 
quasi “first-pillarization”. Second, similar to statutory pensions, these schemes have 
also undergone gradual retrenchment and will offer reduced replacement rates. As a 
result, the development of pension savings has been implicitly promoted, although 
more on a voluntary basis than on a compulsory one. After a presentation of the 
main features of the French pension system and its recent evolution (Part I), this 
chapter will analyse the governance of mandatory pay-as-you-go occupational 
schemes (Part II) as well as the functioning of funded – occupational and personal – 
pension plans (Part III). The second and the third part follow a similar structure. We 
first give an overview of who is covered by the different schemes. Then, we describe 
the type of benefits that are offered and how they are financed. Finally, we analyse 
the administrative and the regulatory governance of the different schemes. 
 
 
Evolution of the Public-Private Pension Mix 
   
The  main  features  of  the  French pension  system 
 
The French pension system relies almost exclusively on the social insurance 
technique. It is a PAYG system which is financed mainly by social security 
contributions as well as by taxes. It is managed by pension funds (caisses d’assurance 
vieillesse) that are independent of the state budget and overseen by administrative 
councils composed of employee and employer representatives. Benefits are earnings-
related and are provided to members of the workforce who have a sufficient 
contribution record. For older people who do not qualify for a contributory pension 
or whose retirement benefits are too low, the state provides a means-tested minimum 
pension2. This is a non contributory scheme, which is financed by income taxes and 
managed by the state. As a result of the high degree of occupational fragmentation of 
the French pension system, one has to distinguish between two types of mandatory 
pension arrangements: those in which the pension has been traditionally provided by 
two separate PAYG pillars and those in which a full pension has until now been 
guaranteed by a single pillar. Wage-earners of the private sector are covered by the 
first type of pension arrangements, whereas, until recently, farmers, most of the self-
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employed and public sector employees had to pay their contributions to a single 
pillar. 
Wage-earners of the private sector (around 60 per cent of the workforce), 
whether they are employed in trade, industry or in the service sector, are covered by a 
statutory scheme called the régime général. This first pillar provides basic defined-
benefit pensions which are financed by social security contributions calculated as a 
percentage of gross wage (14.95% up to a certain ceiling and 1.7% without a ceiling 
in 2008). Benefits are calculated on the basis of the annual average wage of the 25 
years of highest pay, of the duration of insurance as well as of a replacement rate 
which is itself dependent on the duration of insurance and on the age of the insured 
person (with a maximum rate of 50%). Any person who contributed for at least a 
trimester to the régime général is entitled to draw a pension from it. Non-contributory 
periods such as military service, unemployment, maternity leave or sickness are 
recognised up to a certain limit. In addition to this statutory scheme, wage-earners of 
the private sector must also become registered with a mandatory supplementary 
pension scheme (régimes complémentaires obligatoires). Contrary to the régime général which 
was created by statute, the régimes complémentaires were established by collective 
agreements3. Therefore, social partners have an exclusive responsibility for their day-
to-day management. However, these schemes also operate on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
Contributions are paid to independent pension funds which must comply with rules 
set by two federations managed by the social partners. The first federation, ARRCO 
(Association des Régimes de Retraites Complémentaires), regroups all the funds which 
subsidise complementary retirement benefits for all employees. The second 
federation, AGIRC (Association Générale des Institutions de Retraites des Cadres), supervises 
pension funds which finance supplementary pension benefits for managers (the 
‘cadres’). Thus, managers get different benefits and have to pay different 
contribution rates from other wage-earners. Pensions from these supplementary 
schemes are based on the “points” technique: employees receive points in return for 
the contributions they have been paying. The value of these points, which determines 
the level of the pension received, is regularly modified by AGIRC and ARRCO, after 
taking into account changes in the overall economic and demographic situation. 
The principles regulating old-age pensions are roughly the same for farmers (3 
per cent of the workforce) and the self-employed (12 per cent), but their schemes are 
managed by separate organisations (See Table 1). These occupational categories also 
receive a defined-benefit basic pension, calculated on the basis of an annual average 
income (instead of an annual average wage). However, the first pillar in these 
schemes is much more heavily subsidised by the state budget than the régime général. 
Until recently, most of the self-employed did not draw pensions from a second pillar. 
The 2003 Fillon reform has altered this state of affairs: all the self-employed 
(including farmers) now have to pay additional social security contributions to 
supplementary points schemes. 
The organisation of the pension system for public sector employees has 
traditionally differed considerably from private sector schemes, as generous 
retirement benefits have always been guaranteed by a single pillar. Each category of 
public sector employees (20 per cent of the labour force) must join a specific pension 
plan. The degree of fragmentation along occupational lines is very high for these 
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pension arrangements. Civil servants and the military get benefits from the Régime des 
Agents de l’Etat, local government employees from the CNRACL, while people such 
as miners, rail workers, electricity and gas employees who are employed in state-
owned firms or by the state are members of régimes spéciaux. Most of these schemes 
are managed directly by the responsible firm or organisation, while some of them are 
managed by an independent pension fund (CNRACL, miners, Opéra de Paris, 
Comédie Française, seamen, etc.). Although all pension arrangements have their own 
rules, they share significant characteristics (See Dupeyroux et al., 2005, pp. 911-912). 
All of them are PAYG and offer defined-benefit pensions that maintain a living 
standard close to the one enjoyed while the beneficiaries were still in activity. 
Benefits are calculated on the basis of the wage earned during the last six months of 
the worker’s career and the maximum replacement rate is fixed at 75%. Rights are 
acquired after a minimum contribution period of 15 years and the maximum 
replacement rate can be secured after a 37.5 or a 40 year contribution period4. 
However, they also differ in certain respects, notably on the financing method and 
on the minimum age of retirement. Thus, contribution rates vary from 7.75% in the 
miners’ pension scheme to 36.29% in the SNCF (national railway company) pension 
plan while the minimum retirement age spans from 40 years for opera-dancers and 
50 years for railwaymen to 55 years or 60 years for civil servants. Public sector 
schemes have thus historically been more generous. Nevertheless, the architecture of 
these schemes is rapidly changing, as the 2003 reform established a second pillar 
points scheme for all civil servants (Régime additionnel de la fonction publique) and the 
creation of comparable schemes was discussed in 2008 as part of the negotiations 
over the reform of régimes spéciaux.  
The specific architecture of the French pension system has not left much space 
for the development of fully-funded pension plans. As all statutory benefits are 
earnings-related, be they provided by a single pillar or by two different pillars, 
pensioners have been generally able to maintain their income status. Historically, only 
a few occupational categories have benefited from funded pensions: teachers 
(CREF), state employees (PREFON-Retraite), locally elected politicians (FONPEL) as 
well as employees in some private companies (such as in banks or insurance 
companies). However, recent reforms have been systematically promoting the 
creation of private pension arrangements. Since 1994, the self-employed have been 
offered tax incentives in order to sign up for voluntary pension savings schemes. The 
2003 Fillon reform has also introduced two new instruments that will have to make 
up for the future erosion of wage-earners’ statutory pensions. On the one hand, 
social partners are encouraged to negotiate the creation of enterprise-level or 
industry-level voluntary pension schemes (PERCO). On the other hand, tax rebates 
are offered to individuals who will join an individual retirement plan (PERP). These 
programs are still at an embryonic stage, but the relatively high number of people 
who have signed up for a PERP contract5 as well as the already high number of 
individuals who have purchased life insurance contracts6 seem to point to a gradual 
change in the public-private mix within the French pension system. 
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 First Pillar Second Pillar Third Pillar 
  Basic pension Income maintenance Topping-up 
WAGE-EARNERS 
P
ri
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te
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r 
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r 
si
m
il
ar
 s
ta
tu
s)
 
Workers and 
employees in the 
agricultural sector 
M
ea
n
s-
te
st
ed
 m
in
im
u
m
 i
n
co
m
e 
(A
S
P
A
) 
 
Mutualité sociale agricole 
 
ARRC
O 
 
Various funded 
schemes (art. 
83, art. 39, 
PERCO, 
PERP) 
Management staff 
in the agricultural 
sector 
AGIRC 
Management staff 
in industry, trade 
and services 
Régime général de la Sécurité 
sociale (managed by the 
CNAV) 
Workers and 
employees in 
industry, trade and 
services 
 
Wage-earners in 
the public sector 
without tenure 
IRCANTEC Préfon-Retraite 
P
u
b
li
c 
se
ct
o
r 
(o
r 
si
m
il
ar
 s
ta
tu
s)
 
Civil servants and 
Military  
Régime des Agents de l’Etat 
Régime Additionnel de 
la Fonction Publique Préfon-Retraite: 
Voluntary 
fully-funded 
DC scheme 
managed by a 
private 
insurance 
company 
(CNP-
Assurances)  
Civil servants 
employed by 
public hospitals or 
by local authorities 
CNRACL 
Other occupations Régimes spéciaux:  
miners, seamen, workers employed 
by the state, railwaymen, employees 
of the RATP (Paris public transport 
company), employees of state-
owned electricity and gas companies, 
employees of the Banque de France, 
employees of the Comédie Française, 
employees of the Opéra de Paris, 
senators, MPs,… 
 
THE SELF-EMPLOYED 
Farmers 
M
ea
n
s-
te
st
ed
 m
in
.  
in
co
m
e 
Mutualité Sociale Agricole RCO-MSA Voluntary 
fully-funded 
DC schemes 
(contrats 
Madelin) 
Craftsmen 
Régime social des indépendants (formerly 
ORGANIC and AVA) 
RCO-RSI 
Tradesmen and 
manufacturers 
The learned professions CNAVPL  
With 11 professional sections: 
physicians, dentists, chemists, 
chartered accountants, architects,etc 
Supplementary 
schemes (funded or 
PAYG; voluntary or 
mandatory) 
 
CNBF 
Advocates 
 
Avocapi 
Voluntary 
fully-funded 
DC scheme 
 
Table 1 General organisation of the French pension system 
Note: All pension schemes are PAYG and mandatory, unless otherwise specified 
Sources: adapted from AGIRC-ARRCO (2008) ; Préfon (2007) 
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 First Pillar Second Pillar Third Pillar 
 State pensions PAYG 
occupational 
pensions  
Funded occupational 
pensions 
Personal 
pension 
   Employer 
Commitment 
Collective 
agreement 
 
Income (age 
60+) 
     
Third tier 
(topping up / 
replacement 
gap) 
   PERCO – 
voluntary 
fully-funded 
DC); tax 
incentives 
PERP – 
Voluntary 
fully-
funded DC 
schemes; 
Tax 
incentives 
Art. 39 – mandatory fully-
funded DB pensions; tax 
incentives 
 
Art. 83 – mandatory fully-
funded DC; tax incentives 
Second tier  
(income 
maintenance) 
Statutory PAYG 
DB pension 
scheme (régime 
général), financed 
by social 
contributions 
and managed by 
the social 
partners (with 
strong control 
by the 
Executive and 
the Parliament) 
Mandatory 
(‘quasi 
statutory’) 
PAYG 
“points” 
schemes, 
financed by 
social 
contributions 
and managed 
by the social 
partners: 
- for all wage-
earners 
(ARRCO) 
- for executives 
(AGIRC) 
   
First tier  
(poverty 
alleviation) 
Means-tested 
minimum 
income in old-
age (ASPA – 
formerly 
minimum 
vieillesse), tax-
financed 
    
 
Table 2 Pillars and Tiers of French Pensions for wage-earners in the private sector 
ASPA = Allocation de solidarité aux personnes âgées; ARRCO = Association pour le régime 
complémentaire des salaries; AGIRC = Association Générale des Institutions de Retraite des 
Cadres; PERCO = Plan d’épargne retraite collectif; PERP = Plan d’épargne retraite populaire 
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The  changing  public‐private  pension  mix 
 
Like other Bismarckian systems, the French pension system responded to 
demographic and socioeconomic pressures, through a characteristic four-stage 
sequence of transformations, each stage affecting the following one (Bonoli and 
Palier, 2007; see also Bonoli, 2000; Schludi, 2005; Palier, 2010). In the first place, the 
escalation in pension expenditures was coped with through increases in payroll taxes. 
This was the ‘automatic’ adjustment mechanism built into pension systems based on 
social insurance. In the régime général (see figure 1), employers’ contributions were 
gradually raised from 5.50 per cent of gross pay (up to a ceiling) in 1970 to 8.20 per 
cent in 1979. They remained stable until 1991, when the government introduced a 
new contribution, without ceiling, of 1.6 per cent of gross pay. Employees’ 
contribution rates increased from 3 per cent in 1970, to 4.70 per cent in 1979, to 6.55 
per cent in 1991. In 1993 and 1994, contribution rates were also increased by the 
social partners in the ARRCO and AGIRC pension schemes, but these changes 
coincided with a reduction in benefit formulas. 
 
 
Figure 1 Pension contribution rates, régime général, 1967-2005 
Source: data gathered from Bozio (2006), p. 341 
 
 
Pension funding became a critical issue in France, at the beginning of the 1980s. 
Despite the publication of several hard-hitting reports, successive governments 
stalled on reforms for more than a decade for fear of a clash with very militant 
unions. Concerns over rising contribution rates as well as the necessity to comply 
with the Maastricht criteria provided a spur for a first wave of reforms at the 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Employees'  
Contributions 
(with ceiling) 
  
Employers'  
Contributions 
(with ceiling) 
Employers'  
Contributions 
(without ceiling)
 
 
Total  
contribution 
rate 
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beginning of the 1990s. In March 1993, the RPR-UDF (right-wing) coalition secured 
a comfortable majority in the parliamentary election. Soon after, the Balladur 
government presented a reform proposal that was in line with measures suggested in 
an earlier White Paper published by their socialist predecessors in 1991. The Balladur 
reform was limited to the régime général. Three measures aimed directly at a reduction 
in benefits and, possibly, at an increase in retirement age. First, the contribution 
period required to qualify for a full pension of 50 per cent of the reference salary was 
to be increased from 37.5 to 40 years. Second, benefits were to be calculated on the 
basis of the wages earned during the 25 best years of a worker’s career (instead of the 
10 best years). These two changes were to be phased in over eleven years. Third, 
benefit indexation was to be linked to price inflation rather than to wage increases. 
Despite opposition from the socialist party and from trade unions, the Balladur 
reform stands out as one that met with little resistance. In fact, it was negotiated on 
the basis of a quid pro quo between the unions and the government (Bonoli, 1997). 
Retrenchment was made more acceptable as the government acceded to the unions’ 
persistent demand that non-contributory pensions be financed out of general tax 
revenues instead of being financed by social insurance funds. Hence, the reform 
created an ‘old-age solidarity fund’7, which would finance means-tested pensions as 
well as pension credits for non-contributory periods such as military service, 
unemployment, maternity leave or sickness. In 1995, Prime Minister Alain Juppé 
attempted to push through a similar reform in the civil servants’ pension schemes as 
well as in the régimes spéciaux (see Tables 1 and 3), but without prior negotiation with 
the unions. This upsurge of dirigisme sparked off huge demonstrations and is widely 
considered as a cause of the RPR-UDF government’s subsequent defeat in the 1997 
parliamentary election. 
The Balladur reform, Juppé’s failed attempt as well as the publication of a series 
of reports under the socialist government between 1997 and 2002 contributed to a 
dramatisation of the situation of the French pension system. Partly due to this 
climate of insecurity and partly  due to the new opportunities offered by financial 
deregulation, the 1990s saw a growing number of people ‘save’ for their pension, via 
financial products such as life insurance. This relatively unexpected development 
facilitated more radical retrenchment in a second wave of reforms. In 2003, the 
recently elected Raffarin government brought about a major reform that affected 
most pension schemes, with the exception of régimes spéciaux. The most conspicuous 
change has been the gradual equalisation of the contribution period required to 
qualify for a full pension between the civil servants’ pension schemes and the régime 
général (See Table 3). A second key measure was intended to increase employment 
rates among the elderly: a system of disincentives to early retirement (décote, i.e. cut in 
benefit level) as well as of incentives to postponed retirement (surcote, i.e. increase in 
benefit level) was created in all schemes affected by the reform. As these measures 
had come up against fierce opposition and had sparked off large-scale 
demonstrations, the government made a few concessions to the unions (minimum 
pension set at 85 per cent of the minimum wage, retirement at age 58 for workers 
with a long contribution record, slight increase in contribution rate in 2006). 
However, two changes that went practically unnoticed were also introduced by the 
Fillon reform.  
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Year Reform Political context 
1993 Balladur reform (régime général) 
- Reference salary calculated on the basis of 25 best years (instead of 
10 best years) 
- Contribution record for full pension increased from 37.5 years to 
40 years 
- Price indexation instead of wage indexation 
- Establishment of the Fonds de Solidarité Vieillesse to finance non-
contributory benefits (the FSV being financed through CSG) 
RPR-UDF 
coalition (after 
victory in 
general 
election)  
1995 Juppé plan (civil servants’ pension schemes and régimes spéciaux)  
- civil servants’ pension schemes and régimes spéciaux to be ‘aligned’ 
with régime général. Notably, contribution record for full pension to 
be increased from 37.5 years to 40 years, in public sector schemes 
(abortive attempt) 
- extension of governmental and parliamentary control over social 
security budget (Loi de financement de la sécurité sociale)  
RPR-UDF 
coalition (after 
Chirac’s 
victory in 
presidential 
election) 
Mass strike 
1997 Thomas law (not implemented and repealed in 2002) 
- fully-funded DC pension arrangements (plans d’épargne-retraite) to be 
established at the firm level or at the industry level, with voluntary 
participation 
RPR-UDF 
coalition 
(parliamentary 
initiative) 
1993-
1994 
 
1996  
 
2001 
AGIRC and ARRCO agreements 
- increases in contribution rates 
- price indexation of ‘notional contributions’ (points) as well as of 
current benefits 
- clearing system between AGIRC and ARRCO 
- simplified governance (fewer pension funds and greater 
cooperation between the two federations) 
Collective 
agreements  
2003 Fillon reform (various pension schemes) 
- Contribution record for full pension in civil servants’ pension 
schemes increased from 37.5 years to 40 years by 2008 
- Contribution record for full pension in régime général and in civil 
servants’ schemes to be increased from 40 years in 2008 to 41 years 
by 2012 (and 42 years by 2020) 
- Disincentives to early retirement and incentives to postponed 
retirement (all schemes) 
- Merger between pension schemes for the self-employed 
- PAYG points schemes for civil servants and for the self-employed 
- Legal framework for (voluntary) occupational and personal fully-
funded DC pension arrangements 
UMP majority 
(after Chirac’s 
new victory in 
presidential 
election) 
2007-
2008 
Régimes spéciaux reform  
- Contribution record for full pension in régimes spéciaux increased 
from 37.5 years to 40 years 
- Price indexation instead of wage indexation 
- Disincentives to early retirement and incentives to postponed 
retirement 
UMP majority 
(after 
Sarkozy’s 
victory in 
presidential 
election) 
 
Table 3 Chronology of Pension Reforms since the 1980s 
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On the one hand, the craftsmen’s (CANCAVA) and the tradesmen’s and 
manufacturers’ (ORGANIC) social security schemes have been merged into a single 
scheme for the self-employed (Régime social des indépendants). On the other hand, 
mandatory second pillar PAYG points schemes have been created for civil servants 
(as a compensation for the decrease in future benefits), for farmers and for the self-
employed8 These two transformations are indicators of the attempt that is being 
made to reduce the occupational fragmentation of the French pension system and 
hence to promote more flexible labour markets. The model that is being followed is 
clearly the wage-earners’ pension system (régime général and ARRCO/AGIRC). 
Occupational fragmentation has also been at the centre of the 2007-2008 reform 
of régimes spéciaux. During the run-up to the 2007 presidential election, Nicolas 
Sarkozy persistently denounced the fact that some categories of the population 
enjoyed ‘unfair privileges’ that other groups did not have. Clearly signalled during the 
election campaign, a reform of régimes spéciaux was announced by the Fillon 
government in October 2007. The proposed measures were modelled on the 2003 
Fillon reform (See Table 3) and, one of the measures put forward in order to 
overcome the unions’ fierce opposition to the reform was the creation of 
supplementary PAYG points pensions that would partly offset the decrease in public 
sector pension benefits. Despite the nationwide strikes and demonstrations that were 
organised in protest, the UMP governments took advantage of the traditional 
divisions between trade unions and succeeded in pushing through major reforms 
both in 2003 and in 2007-2008. In this second wave of reforms, retrenchment was 
tolerated by the population, arguably because of growing concerns over inequalities 
between different occupational groups (private sector workers vs. public sector 
employees) and because of growing acceptance of fully-funded pensions as a 
complement to public pensions. 
The 2003 Fillon reform was also a breakaway from the existing public-private 
mix, given that it conspicuously planned to promote the development of voluntary 
retirement savings plans. For the first time, a stable legal framework has been 
introduced for voluntary occupational (PERCO) and personal (PERP) fully-funded 
DC pension arrangements (See section 4). Like in many Bismarckian systems, the 
first wave (1993) and the second wave (2003/2007-2008) of reforms resulted in the 
fact that younger cohorts of workers started to join pension funds and began to save 
for their own retirement. The development of these schemes is still at an initial stage, 
but the number of contributors to these schemes has been growing steadily since 
their introduction. The popularity of personal pension plans is in line with the 
enduring popularity of life insurance in France, whereas the fact that coverage by 
firm-level and sector-level occupational pensions is still very low is due to the 
weakness of the French collective bargaining system. 
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The Governance of Supplementary Pensions 
 
Second pillar: mandatory PAYG occupational pensions – Towards a “first-
pillarization”? 
 
The organisation of French occupational pensions is unique, as the great bulk of 
them is not fully-funded but based on pay-as-you-go financing. PAYG occupational 
schemes were created for managers in 1947 (AGIRC) and for other workers in 1961 
(ARRCO) and became mandatory for all wage-earners of the private-sector in 1972. 
Although the ARRCO scheme could be initially characterised as ‘occupational’ given 
that contribution levels and benefit formulas differed according to the company or 
industry in which workers were employed, the gradual harmonisation of ARRCO 
schemes (see below) implies that the distinctiveness of French supplementary 
schemes has changed meaning in that they are ‘occupational’, not because they are 
negotiated at the industry level or at the firm level, but because they are organised 
according to the socio-economic status of the beneficiaries (wage-earners vs. the self-
employed, managers vs. employees and workers, public sector employees vs. private 
sector employees). Indeed, based on the AGIRC/ARRCO model, mandatory PAYG 
points schemes have been gradually extended to other occupational categories. Thus, 
a special scheme was created in 1970 for  employees in the public sector who do not 
have a tenure (IRCANTEC9) and another one was set up for craftsmen in 1978. 
Other categories of workers were excluded from them until recently, but 
occupational PAYG point schemes were created in 2003 for the self-employed, for 
farmers and for civil servants. This section concentrates upon ARRCO and AGIRC 
schemes since they cover approximately two thirds of the workforce and because 
they provided the model that was followed while creating similar schemes for other 
occupational categories. 
 
What kind of benefits? 
 
ARRCO and AGIRC supplementary pensions are “points schemes”. Participants 
in the schemes earn pension points based on their individual earnings (as well as on 
the “price of the point”; see fn. 10) in exchange for the contributions they pay into 
the system. The pension points are filed in the records of the pension manager 
during the participant’s career and at retirement the supplementary pension benefit is 
calculated by multiplying the sum of the pension points by a “pension-point value”10. 
Thus, the pension that is drawn depends on the wages earned during the whole 
career of the insured, and although these “points schemes” are not defined-
contribution plans per se, they share characteristics with notional defined contribution 
pension plans (See Legros, 2006; Holzmann and Palmer, 2006). 
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Table 4 Mandatory PAYG occupational schemes (retraite complémentaire obligatoire) 
Sources: *Unless otherwise stated, AGIRC-ARRCO (2008)  ** http://www.arrco.fr/chiffres-cles0/donnees-
statistiques/  
Notes: *figures are for 2006 **figures on December 31, 2007 
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AGIRC pensions are drawn only by managers of the private sector while 
ARRCO pensions are received by all wage-earners of the private sector (including 
managers). Contributions are paid not only by employees having full-time and/or 
permanent contracts, but also by workers in atypical employment (i.e. having part-
time and/or fixed-term contracts). Their contributions and, consequently their 
benefits, are calculated on the same basis as those of standard workers. 
The retirement age at ARRCO and AGIRC is normally set at 65. However, given 
that the statutory retirement age (i.e. in the régime général) was set at 60 in 1982, social 
partners negotiated the possibility of drawing a full supplementary pension at age 60 
and even from age 55 although this entails a cut in the benefit level. Since the Fillon 
reform has made it possible for workers aged 58 to get a full pension if they have had 
a long contribution record, the social partners have negotiated the possibility for 
workers to receive an ARRCO or an AGIRC pension without a cut in the benefit 
level, from the moment when the full statutory pension is drawn. There is no 
minimum contributory period and benefits can be drawn even if the beneficiary lives 
abroad. As a result, vesting is automatic and the portability of pension rights is 
ensured by the fact that ARRCO and AGIRC are national – and not industry-level – 
schemes applying to all wage-earners of the private sector. However, there is no 
possibility to transfer pension points from ARRCO or AGIRC to the other newly 
created occupational PAYG points schemes or vice versa. Although ARRCO and 
AGIRC pensions are much less redistributive than DB pensions received from the 
régime général, “free” pension points can be earned for non contributory periods such 
as unemployment, early retirement, maternity or sickness. Moreover, both ARRCO 
and AGIRC offer pension bonuses to those retirees who raised three children or 
more during their career. Finally, both schemes offer benefits to the surviving spouse 
or to orphaned children under the age of 2111.  
Although the principles underlying the way benefits are calculated have been 
stable, the purchasing power of AGIRC/ARRCO benefits has been reduced in 
recent years, as the social partners have been altering indexation mechanisms. Both 
the price of the point (PP) and the pension point value (PV) are indexed. In 1993, 
the social partners decided to increase the price of the point – and hence to decrease 
benefit levels – by indexing it to a much higher value than the evolution of prices and 
of average wages. Moreover, they decided to decrease the value of the point by 
indexing it to price inflation rather than to wage inflation. Between 2003 and 2008, 
the price of the point was indexed again to the evolution of the average wage, but the 
pension point value continued to be indexed to price inflation (See figures 2 and 3). 
In 2006, the average monthly benefit of all beneficiaries12 was approximated at 257 
euros in ARRCO and 728 in AGIRC, compared to 505 euros in the régime général. 
Women’s pensions were lower than men’s by 42% in ARRCO and by 60% in 
AGIRC13 compared to 29% in the statutory scheme (DREES, 2008b, p. 3). 
According to government estimations (COR, 2007b, pp. 64)14, ARRCO pensions 
offered in 2003 a wage replacement rate of 27.6% for a standard worker born in 1938 
who had worked 40 years during his career, compared to 55.9% in the régime général15. 
A manager born the same year and having worked the same amount of time got a 
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wage replacement rate of 11.8% in ARRCO, 25.4% in AGIRC and 26.9% in the 
statutory scheme16. 
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Figure 2 Benefit levels in UNIRS-ARRCO and prices (% change on previous year), 
1981-2008 
Source: Own calculations; data gathered from Bozio (2006), from ARRCO website and from OECD Stat 
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Figure 3 Benefit levels in AGIRC and prices (% change on previous year), 1980-
2008 
Source: Own calculations; data gathered from Bozio (2006), from AGIRC website and from OECD Stat 
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Who pays? 
 
ARRCO and AGIRC schemes are financed by joint contributions. Wage-earners 
who are not ‘cadres’ must pay contributions only to ARRCO, while ‘cadres’17 have to 
pay contributions both to ARRCO and to AGIRC as they draw pensions from both 
schemes18. The basis on which contributions are assessed is set according to the 
social security ceiling (which was equal to 2773 euros per month in 2008). Until 1999, 
executives paid higher contributions than non-executives, and as a result got a higher 
number of pension points. However, a consensus has emerged among the social 
partners to harmonise benefit formulas between the two schemes. Hence, non-
executives and executives now pay the same total contribution rate below the ceiling 
as well as above the ceiling, even though employer rates and employee rates are not 
necessarily the same.  
In order to cope with possible financial imbalances within the occupational 
schemes, the social partners made a distinction between different types of 
contribution rates when AGIRC and ARRCO were created. Given that pension 
points are calculated according to the contributions that are paid by the insured into 
the system, a simple rise in contribution rates would have led to a higher number of 
points earned. Therefore, it was necessary to allow for the possibility of mobilizing 
more financial resources without automatically granting rights to higher benefits. 
Thus, one must distinguish between three different contribution rates. The 
‘contractual’ contribution rate (taux contractuel) is used as a basis to calculate pension 
points whereas the ‘effective rate’ (taux effectif) is the contribution rate that is 
effectively paid by companies. This ‘effective rate’ is the product of the ‘contractual 
rate’ and of the ‘calling rate’ (taux d’appel). The calling rate was lower than 100% at 
the inception of the schemes (Bozio, 2006, p. 70) but it was gradually raised from the 
early 1970s, in order to cope with growing expenditures due to the maturation of the 
system and with future demographic imbalances. In the AGIRC scheme, it reached 
103% in 1979, 106% in 1986 and was set at 125% in 1995. In the ARRCO scheme, 
the calling rate was set at 102.5% in 1970 and has been stable at 125 % since 1992 
(d’Yvoire, 2005, p. 10). Until the early 1990s, companies could also pay 
supplementary contributions into the AGIRC/ARRCO schemes in order to top-up 
their employees’ retirement income. However, this option has been phased out since 
1993 (Reynaud, 1997, pp. 86-88), given that AGIRC and ARRCO institutions could 
be accused of enjoyed a monopoly in a market that could potentially be penetrated 
by insurance companies or mutual societies and, therefore, of being in breach of EU 
competition rules. It was decided simultaneously that the commercial activities of 
AGIRC/ARRCO pension institutions in other areas of supplementary social 
protection (such as retirement savings, complementary health insurance, etc.) had to 
be operated in distinctive administrative entities called “provident institutions” 
(“institutions de prévoyance”). 
The responsibility for the financial governance of AGIRC and ARRCO lies with 
representatives of trade unions and employers’ associations who have the ability to 
change the different parameters that determine the financial equilibrium of the 
system. The social partners have been using this capacity, notably by raising 
contributions and by changing indexation mechanisms. Efforts have also been made 
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to generate annual surpluses, which are invested in financial products and will be 
used to deal with future imbalances due to ageing. Moreover, changes have been 
introduced in the administrative governance of both schemes in order to bring down 
management costs and centralise control over the schemes’ finances. 
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Régime général 
Employee: 6.65% 
Employer: 8.3% 
Total: 14.95 % 
  
Régime général 
Employer: + 1.6% (without ceiling) 
Employee: + 0.1% (without ceiling) 
ARRCO 
Employee: 2.4% 
Employer: 3.6% 
Calling rate: 125% 
Effective rate: 7.5% 
+2%* 
+ 0.35%** 
AGIRC 
Employee: 6% 
Employer: 10% 
Calling rate: 125% 
Effective rate: 20% 
+2.20%* 
+0.35%** 
AGIRC 
Employee: 6% 
Employer: 10% 
Calling rate: 125% 
Effective rate: 20% 
 
+0.35%** 
 
Table 5 Contribution rates in first pillar and second pillar wage-earners’ schemes 
 
Notes: the ceiling in 2008 is 2773 EUR per month 
*special contribution destined to finance retirement before the age of 65 
**Special Temporary contribution 
Sources: Adapted from Legros (2006) and from URSSAF as well as AGIRC-ARRCO websites (Feb. 
2008) 
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Who governs? Who decides? Who manages? 
 
Wage-earners’ PAYG supplementary schemes have a two-level governance 
system. They are administered at the local level by autonomous supplementary 
pension institutions and at the national level by the ARRCO and AGIRC federations. 
Both the pension institutions and the federations are supervised by the social 
partners. The administrative governance of the schemes has been undergoing 
considerable changes in the last decade. Firstly, regulation has been harmonised 
within the ARRCO system since the beginning of the nineties. Secondly, there has 
been an increased cooperation between ARRCO and AGIRC, which results in a 
wave of mergers between the paritarian19 pension institutions.  
When AGIRC and ARRCO were established by collective agreements in 1947 
and in 1961 respectively, they inherited an already elaborate network of various 
occupational schemes. Both agreements aimed at extending supplementary pensions 
to other categories of workers and the “points” technique was adopted from the 
outset in both systems. However, while rules concerning eligibility criteria, 
contributions levels as well as benefit levels were unified in the AGIRC scheme20, 
they remained relatively diverse in the ARRCO system. Each pension institution was 
thus allowed to set its own parameters, although the ARRCO federation imposed set 
minimum standards so as to be able to fulfil the function of a clearing house between 
the different pension funds. Moreover, some supplementary schemes continued to 
operate outside of the AGIRC-ARRCO system, but they have been gradually 
integrated into it since the early nineties (See, for instance, developments in the 
banking sector – section 4.5). In 1996, the social partners signed an agreement that 
led to the harmonisation of rules in ARRCO from 1999 and a centralisation of 
decision-making at the federation level. At the time, the ARRCO was composed of 
45 different schemes that were managed by 90 different pension institutions. The 
AGIRC scheme was administered by 55 different funds.  
In addition to the changes made in ARRCO, the social partners have encouraged 
a more effective cooperation between the two wage-earners’ schemes and a 
rationalisation in their administrative governance. These developments are partly due 
to pressures coming from the European Union and partly due to a commitment to 
bring down management costs. In November 1998, the social partners agreed to 
comply with Regulation (EEC) 1408/71, which organises social protection for 
migrant workers within the European Union. This decision means that both AGIRC 
and ARRCO have to implement a set of rules that normally apply to statutory 
schemes, even though they remain controlled by the social partners. It also means 
that they cannot be considered as potential competitors in the European market for 
supplementary pensions and, as a result, that they will not be subject to anti-trust 
regulation. Nevertheless, it means that the pension institutions’ commercial activities 
in the field of supplementary social protection must be kept separate from their 
‘quasi-statutory’ activities. These new demands as well as an emerging effort to cut 
administrative costs have led the social partners to foster cooperation between 
ARRCO and AGIRC from 2001. A common IT framework has been established and 
regulation within both institutions as well as administrative procedures used when 
dealing with firms have been harmonised. Finally, the paritarian pension institutions 
22                                 Working Papers on the Reconciliation of Work and Welfare in Europe 
 
have been encouraged to create clusters that comprise at least one AGIRC fund and 
one ARRCO fund.   
By 2008, 28 clusters have been constituted. AGIRC funds have merged into 21 
institutions, while ARRCO funds have been grouped into 33 different institutions. 
These clusters have been building common information and management systems, 
and should result in the creation of fully integrated ‘paritarian groups’21 (La Tribune 
de l’Assurance, 2006; Laigre and Langlois, 2006). Besides reducing administrative 
costs in the mandatory PAYG schemes, the creation of strong groups of paritarian 
institutions also serves the purpose of promoting the creation of a ‘competitive 
paritarianism’ (‘paritarisme concurrentiel’)22 that will enable their commercial branches 
(the so-called “provident institutions”23) to compete with insurance companies and 
mutual aid societies in the emerging market of private supplementary social 
protection24. 
 
 
Gradually overcoming the taboo: The institutionalisation of a funded 
third pillar 
 
Since the Second World War, French old-age pensions have overwhelmingly 
been financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. Statutory and supplementary pension 
schemes have traditionally offered benefits that give a replacement rate of roughly 
70% to 75%, funded pensions have been used mainly as a means to top up 
retirement income.  Given the high degree of occupational fragmentation within 
statutory pension schemes and therefore divergent needs among different categories 
of workers, the development of funded pensions has also been characterised by a 
very high degree of decentralisation and, therefore, by multiple governance 
structures. Until the 1990s, funded schemes were established spontaneously for a 
limited number of occupational categories and did not operate under a unified 
regulatory framework. Public sector employees have traditionally had the widest 
access to voluntary DC pension savings plans. The CREF25 was created primarily for 
state school teachers as early as in 1947. Hospital staff can join the CRH26 since 1963. 
Trade unions in the public sector established the PREFON27 in 1967 for all public 
sector employees. Finally, locally elected officials created their own pension funds 
FONPEL28 and CAREL29 in 1993. State intervention was necessary to promote the 
creation of special voluntary schemes for farmers (“Exploitants agricoles” contracts 
– ex-COREVA30) and for the self-employed (“Madelin” contracts). 
Wage-earners in the private sector have historically had a more limited access to 
funded pension plans. Occupational pensions have been provided almost exclusively 
at the firm level, as collective bargaining is highly decentralised. The main forms of 
company pension plans have been mandatory DB pensions (art. 39 CGI31) as well as 
mandatory DC pensions (art. 83 CGI). The Fillon reform has also introduced the 
possibility of setting up occupational DC pension schemes with voluntary 
participation (PERCO32). Until 2003, France had no stable legislation concerning 
individual savings plans which would be intended exclusively for pension savings and 
that would be available to all individuals, particularly to wage-earners. The 
introduction of such financial products was checked because of long-standing 
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opposition coming from left-wing parties and trade unions as well as because of 
dissensions within the business community, particularly between potential 
competitors on the private pension market, such as insurers, commercial banks, and 
mutual aid societies (See Palier, 2003, 2007). Therefore, since the 1980s, the 
dominant form of voluntary retirement savings among wage-earners of the private 
sector has been life insurance (Palier, 2007, p. 101), as it offers generous tax 
incentives and relatively high rates of return. In 2003-2004, 35% of French 
households had subscribed to a life insurance contract and 27% of them declared 
that they had done so to better prepare their retirement (DREES, 2006b). It was only 
in 2003 that the government introduced the first retirement savings product that is 
available to all categories of workers (PERP33). 
 
Who is covered? 
 
Wage-earners in the private sector can participate in three types of occupational 
– overwhelmingly company-level – pension schemes: mandatory DB schemes (“art. 
39”),  mandatory DC schemes (“art. 83”) as well as voluntary DC schemes 
(“PERCO”). Art. 39 schemes have been generally offered to a limited number of 
senior managers employed in large companies34 as a top-up to mandatory PAYG 
pensions. At retirement, top executives – who are very frequently in the highest 
income brackets – face a sharp decline in their income, as the benefits provided to 
them by the régime général and ARRCO/AGIRC often attain a wage replacement rate 
of only 25%-35%. Thus, such DB schemes have been pervasive in major firms such 
as CAC 40 companies, as they are considered a useful HR tool that helps improve 
recruitment and retention of highly skilled workforce. Some firms, such as Saint-
Gobain, Elf-Aquitaine (See Quillet, 1997), Usinor-Sacilor, Rhodia, Rhône-Poulenc or 
insurance companies offered art. 39 final salary schemes to a larger number of 
workers than just management staff, until the mid-90s. However, due to changing 
accounting standards and the necessity to incorporate pension liabilities into 
company accounts, many of the schemes with wider coverage have been closed to 
new entrants and replaced by art. 83 pension plans (Les Echos, 2005a). Such 
mandatory DC schemes cover a much wider number of wage-earners, as they are 
generally accessible to a much larger pool of employees in the companies that 
provide them. Therefore, art. 83 schemes are the most prevalent form of 
occupational pensions. The insurance sector scheme (see section 4.5), the only 
mandatory funded pension scheme that has been negotiated at the industry level in 
France and which covers about 130,000 people, is an art. 83 plan. In total, 
approximately 2,700,000 to 2,800,000 workers were covered by mandatory DC plans 
in 2006, compared with 2,300,000 to 2,500,000 people in 2005 (DREES, 2008, p. 3) 
and 2,200,000 in 2004 (DREES, 2006b, p. 3). Beneficiaries of art. 83 schemes are 
generally workers with a stable employment history, as these schemes are usually 
accessible after a minimum length of service in the company (e.g. 12 months). 
 
 
 
 
24                                 Working Papers on the Reconciliation of Work and Welfare in Europe 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
T
a
b
le
 6
 F
u
n
d
ed
 o
ccu
p
atio
n
al sch
em
es (retraite p
ro
fessio
n
n
elle su
p
p
lém
en
taire) 
N
otes: *C
overage defined as num
ber of people w
ho contribute to a schem
e. D
ata on coverage indicated for the end of 2007 (D
R
E
E
S
, 2009).  A
C
A
M
 =
 
A
utorité de C
ontrôle des A
ssurances et des M
utuelles (Insurance and M
utual aid societies S
upervisory A
uthority). 
S
ource: S
énat (2006), D
R
E
E
S
 (2009)   
Naczyk, Palier: Complementing or replacing old age insurance?        25 
 
Contrary to art. 39 and art. 83 plans which can be offered to a limited group of 
workers in the company, voluntary DC schemes (PERCO) must legally cover all 
employees of a company or of a branch. Moreover, PERCOs are in principle more 
accessible to atypical workers: the maximum length of service after which a worker is 
allowed to join the pension plan is 3 months. PERCOs were created in 2004 and 
their development was relatively slow at the beginning, as collective agreements had 
first to be negotiated at the firm or at the inter-firm level. However, the number of 
companies offering such plans is steadily growing (37,000 companies at the end of 
2006 compared to 23,000 at the end of 2005). Access to these schemes is highest for 
people who work in very large companies35 and is marginal in SMEs36, although very 
small companies37 have shown relatively more interest for this product as directors of 
such companies are exceptionally allowed to put their savings in such plans. Given 
their voluntary character, only 102,000 people contributed to a PERCO plan in 2005, 
a number which increased to 201,000 in 200638.  
PERP, the newly created individual retirement savings plan, is the only pension 
product that is available to all categories of workers (private-sector wage-earners, 
public sector employees, the self-employed and farmers). During the two years that 
followed its creation, PERP rapidly attracted a high number of subscribers: 1.2 
million people in 2004, followed by another 0.5 million at the end of 2005. However, 
this growth rate has been declining ever since, as the product attracted only 211,000 
and 130,000 new subscribers in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Thus, at the end of 2007, 
PERP counts approximately 1.99 million people contributors and only 1000 
beneficiaries. Sign-up rates among PERP’s target population (i.e. wage-earners) are 
estimated at 8.6% (FFSA, 2008). In terms of gender, PERP is the individual 
retirement savings product that attracts the most equal population, as 47% of its 
subscribers are women, while they represent only 40% of subscribers to PERCO and 
38% to Madelin contracts39 (DREES, 2008, p. 6). 
 
What kind of benefits? 
 
Funded supplementary pensions still represent a very minor part of pension 
expenditure in France. In 2006, only 4.2 billion euros were spent on pension 
annuities (less than 2% of total pension expenditure)40. 48% of all such benefits were 
paid as part of a defined-benefit scheme (DREES, 2008a). French companies offer 
two types of art. 39 DB pension plans: “retraites chapeau” and “retraites additives”. In the 
first type of schemes, the company commits itself to provide a guaranteed 
replacement rate (e.g. 50%-70% of the last wage41), by paying the difference between 
the pensions offered by the statutory and ARRCO/AGIRC schemes and that 
replacement rate. In the case of an “additive” pension, the company generally 
guarantees a lower replacement rate (e.g. 10% of the last wage or 1% of the last wage 
per year of service in the company). However, it does so regardless of the benefit 
amount received by the employee from mandatory PAYG schemes. DB pensions 
provided to senior executive staff in large companies are generally calculated on the 
basis of the wages earned during the very last years of their career (e.g. last two years 
at Dexia42 or last three years at France Telecom43). This means that benefit levels may 
be very high44. Since increases in life expectancy, as well as decreases in benefits 
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provided by the régime général and by ARRCO/AGIRC, multiply the costs associated 
with “chapeau” schemes, companies are increasingly transforming them into 
“additive” schemes (e.g. BNP Paribas). Given that the objective of company-level 
DB plans is to develop staff loyalty, art. 39 schemes do not have to guarantee vesting 
of rights. Therefore, in order to get their benefit, employees must generally be 
employed by the company at retirement.  
Contrary to art. 39 schemes, vesting is automatic in DC pension plans (art. 83, 
PERCO and PERP). Benefit levels are entirely determined by the level of 
contributions that have been paid into the scheme as well as by the investment 
performance achieved by the pension manager. In the case of mandatory 
occupational DC schemes (art. 83), the level of contributions depends on the number 
of years in which the employee has been working in the company and on his past 
earnings. In the case of voluntary DC schemes (PERCO, PERP), it depends entirely 
on the individual decisions of the savers45. These plans exclude any element of 
interpersonal solidarity. However, art. 83 schemes often grant credits for non-
contributory periods such as illness, maternity or parental leave. Indexation of 
benefits can either be guaranteed by contract (at 2.5% for example) or it can be a 
function of the fund’s performance.  
DC pensions are in general paid in the form of a lifetime annuity46. However, in the 
case of PERCO, collective agreements may open up the possibility for the insured to 
choose between a lump-sum payment and periodic instalments. In principle, sums 
paid into DC schemes cannot be withdrawn before retirement age. Nevertheless, 
legislation allows early exit in a few exceptional cases: if the beneficiary becomes an 
invalid, or if he or she loses unemployment insurance benefits. PERP and PERCO 
also allow early withdrawals in case of excessive debt or if the insured buy their main 
home. Transfers of contributions paid into one DC plan to another are possible, but 
the insured are then liable to pay transfer costs. 
 
Who pays? 
 
While all DC plans are funded47, the financing of art. 39 final salary schemes was not 
regulated until the mid-nineties. In fact, company-level pension plans could operate 
on a pay-as-you-go basis, but this mode of financing was forbidden in 199448. Art. 39 
pension plans must be either fully-funded or financed through book reserves on 
company balance sheets. The implementation of these regulations was not entirely 
effective and has been strengthened by the 2003 Fillon reform as well as by the 
introduction of the new IFRS accounting standards. Since as a result of these 
regulatory changes many company plans found themselves in deficit and since book 
reserves are subject to an unfavourable tax regime49, art. 39 plans are increasingly 
being financed through group insurance contracts signed with insurance companies 
or with provident institutions (Les Echos, 2005b). Such DB schemes are always 
financed exclusively by employer contributions. Art. 83 schemes are necessarily 
financed by employer contributions and may be financed by employee contributions, 
especially when the plan is set up through a collective agreement50. Voluntary 
contributions to art. 83 are not allowed. However, the Fillon reform has sought to 
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allow for such an option by introducing the PERE (Plan d’épargne-retraite d’entreprise), a 
product that is similar to art. 83 schemes in all respects, apart from that one.  
Nevertheless, the schemes exclusively based on voluntary contributions are the 
PERCO, the PERP and public-sector pension funds. In these plans, the decision to 
put money aside lies entirely in the hands of individuals: contributions must come 
from their own savings51. Of all individual savings accounts, the PERCO is the most 
peculiar one, as it most strongly combines the characteristics of a personal pension 
plan with those of an occupational one. Given that these schemes are established at 
the firm level, contributions may come not only from individual savings, but also 
from profit sharing schemes52 as well as from employees’ “working time savings 
accounts”53. Contrary to PERP or public-sector schemes in which contribution 
amounts are in principle unlimited, annual contributions to PERCO cannot exceed 
one fourth of the worker’s gross pay for the year. Another specificity of PERCO is 
that employers must cover management fees and, as in U.S. 401(k) accounts, they 
may offer matching contributions on their employees’ payments into the scheme. 
Such employer matching contributions may be set, in relative terms, at a maximum 
of 300% of the employees’ voluntary contributions and, in absolute terms, at max. 
16% of one annual social security ceiling54. The level of employer matching 
contributions is always established through collective agreement and may be 
differentiated according to the origin of contributions (individual savings, profit 
sharing schemes, working time savings accounts) or according to characteristics such 
as the worker’s length of service in the company or his or her occupational category.  
 
 
 Company Individual 
art. 83, art. 
39 
global contribution to 
occupational pension schemes is 
exempted from corporate income 
tax up to 8% of a sum equal to 8 
times the ASSC* (i.e. max. 21,296 
euros in 2008) 
global contribution to supplementary (occupational and 
individual) pension plans is exempted from personal 
income tax up to 10% of taxable income (with max. 8% of 
a sum equal to 8 times the ASSC* - i.e. max. 21,296 euros 
in 2008) 
PERCO employer matching contributions 
are tax exempted  
- Employer matching contributions are totally exempted 
from personal income tax 
- Contributions coming from profit sharing schemes are 
exempted from personal income tax up to 8% of a sum 
equal to 8 times the ASSC* (i.e. max. 21,296 euros in 
2008) 
- no tax relief for contributions from individual’s own 
savings 
- all contributions are subjected to CSG and CRDS 
PERP, 
PREFON, 
Madelin, 
exploitant 
agricoles 
Not applicable global contribution to supplementary (occupational and 
individual) pension plans is exempted from personal 
income tax up to 10% of taxable income (with max. 8% of 
a sum equal to 8 times the ASSC* - i.e. max. 21,296 euros 
in 2008) 
 
Table 7 Tax incentives 
Notes: *the ASSC (annual social security ceiling) was set at 33,276 EUR in 2008 
Sources: Sénat (2008) 
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Former employees can continue to contribute to their PERCO if they do not 
have access to one in their new company. However, they cannot benefit from 
employer matching contributions and must pay themselves to cover management 
fees. 
 
In order to promote occupational and individual pensions, governments have 
put in place tax incentives for both employers and savers. The global contribution to 
supplementary schemes55 may be exempted from corporate income tax, while 
contributions to régime général and to AGIRC/ARRCO are totally tax-exempt. 
Moreover, employers are exempted from paying social security contributions on 
employer contributions to supplementary schemes up to 5% of one annual social 
security ceiling56. The total amount of revenue uncollected by the social security 
system due to such exemptions was estimated at 2.9 billion euros in 2005 (Assemblée 
Nationale, 2008, pp. 159-160). Savers benefit from an EET (Exempt, exempt, tax) 
tax regime. PERCO has a different tax regime, as individual savings put into the 
scheme are not tax-exempt and no income tax has to be paid at exit if the individual 
decides to have his or her pension paid in the form of a lump sum. 
 
Who governs? Who decides? Who manages? 
 
Because of the decentralised nature of funded schemes in France, governance 
structures vary widely between different schemes. In firm-level mandatory schemes, 
beneficiaries have little to say about the choice of products in which their savings are 
invested. All these choices are made by the pension manager and are supervised 
either by the employer himself or by a bipartite supervisory board. The organisation 
of these schemes most often depends on how they were initiated. Art. 39 and art. 83 
plans can be established through three possible channels: a unilateral decision of the 
employer, a proposal of the employer put to a referendum or a collective agreement. 
Art. 39 DB schemes that cover senior management staff are almost always created 
through the first channel and are therefore usually overseen by the company’s board 
of directors, which leaves no room for trade union control. These schemes are 
managed either by the company itself (book reserves) or by an insurance company 
(through a group insurance contract).  
As the more encompassing art. 39 DB schemes (see sections 4.1 and 4.5) were 
generally established through collective agreements, they were managed by specific 
paritarian institutions and were financed on a PAYG basis. However, due to the 
restrictions imposed on this mode of financing, the governance of these schemes has 
been profoundly modified in recent years. The paritarian institutions that managed 
them have been transformed into supervisory boards57, while the day-to-day running 
of the schemes has been increasingly delegated to insurance companies or to 
“provident institutions” (i.e. the commercial branches of the ARRCO/AGIRC 
paritarian institutions). Delegation of management is also very often the rule in art. 
83 DC schemes. However, a few companies (for instance, Société Générale and 
Nestlé) have established their own “provident institutions”, supervised by bipartite 
boards. In this type of plans, the employer and trade unions have in principle much 
larger decision-making powers concerning the running of the pension plan. 
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However, it remains unclear whether their role is more decisive in key investment 
decisions than in plans whose management is delegated to an insurance company or 
another provident institution. 
The pension funds that have been introduced by the Fillon reform have a 
different type of governance. Although PERCO are also occupational pension 
schemes, they are tightly linked to firm-level workers’ participation schemes and to 
wage-earners savings programmes (épargne salariale). They must always be 
established through a collective agreement and cannot be established unless a short-
term savings plan (plan d’épargne salariale) is also available in the company. As 
PERCO are voluntary pension plans, the insured are given much more leeway to 
make their own investment decisions and must be presented with a choice between 
at least three mutual funds (OPCVM58), so that the insured may diversify their risks. 
PERCOs can also provide access to firm-level investment funds (Fonds communs de 
placement d’entreprise), which are allowed to invest part of the collected 
contributions into company assets.  
PERP plans are managed by insurance companies, mutual aid societies or 
provident institutions. However, they are kept under the supervision of non-profit 
‘popular pension savings groups’ (GERP59) which are independent of the pension 
manager and in fact initiate the plans by entering into a group insurance contract 
with a financial company. The GERP’s mission is to inform participants about 
developments in the PERP and to control the pension manager through a 
supervisory board and an annual general meeting of the insured. The annual general 
meeting of the insured is responsible for making all necessary modifications in the 
PERP contract and may also decide to change the pension manager. Although 
investment choices are more limited than in PERCO, as investment decisions are 
made by the pension manager, state regulation requires that the savings accumulated 
by an individual be made more secure the closer the individual is to retirement age60. 
Until the late eighties, state supervision of supplementary pensions was limited 
to controlling insurance companies. However, in 1989, an executive agency – the 
CCMIP61 - was created in order to monitor mutual aid societies as well as provident 
institutions that are active in the market for supplementary social protection. As its 
control powers were limited due to lack of staff, the CCMIP has been merged with 
the insurance watchdog in 2005, creating the ACAM62. State regulation concerning 
insolvency protection has also been strengthened in recent years. An insolvency fund 
was created for life insurance companies63 in 1999. Provident institutions have been 
running their own fund64 since 2003. Both funds are financed through contributions 
of the participating companies and insure savers’ assets up to a maximum of 70,000 
euros. Although the creation of a similar fund for mutual aid societies was officially 
legislated in 2001, the decrees that are needed to ensure the implementation of the 
measure had not yet been published in 2008. However, the French federation of 
mutual aid societies65, an organisation which represents a majority of mutual aid 
societies, has been operating its own guarantee fund66 since 2002. To date, defined-
benefit pensions that are financed through book reserves are not protected against 
insolvency. 
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Case studies: the changing governance of supplementary pensions in the 
insurance sector and in the banking sector 
 
Developments in the insurance and in the banking sector illustrate the profound 
transformations that French supplementary pensions have been undergoing in the 
last two decades: further integration and harmonisation of all supplementary PAYG 
schemes within the ARRCO/AGIRC framework, closure of “chapeau” schemes to 
new entrants and development of employer-provided art. 83 DC plans. 
 
Supplementary pensions in the insurance sector 
Similarly to most private sector firms, insurance companies have been 
participating to the ARRCO/AGIRC pension schemes since their inception. 
However, in 1978, insurers instituted their own private defined-benefit pension plan, 
which covered all employees in the industry67 and was financed on a pay-as-you-go 
basis. At the early nineties, a number of events put increasing strains on the 
functioning of the scheme. First, the 1993 ARRCO collective agreement planned a 
gradual increase – from 4% in 1995 to 6% in 1999 – in the ‘contractual rate’ (see p. 
21) of contributions. Second, a statute promulgated in 1994 forced occupational 
pension schemes to switch gradually from PAYG financing to full funding or 
funding through book reserves. Third, the scheme was weakened by the fact that its 
risk pool was limited to only 150,000 contributors and pensioners. At the insistence 
of the Federation of French insurers68, trade unions signed a collective agreement 
that provided for the closure of the “chapeau” scheme to new entrants from 1996. 
The scheme’s reserves69 as well as supplementary assets70 provided by the 
participating insurance companies were transferred to an insurance company – the 
SACRA71 - that was created for the sole purpose of managing existing and future 
beneficiaries’ acquired rights. This fund is supervised by a board72 composed of 4 
representatives of insurance companies and 4 representatives of the industry’s trade 
unions (La Tribune de l’Assurance, 2001). 
As a compensation for the loss of these industry-level privileges, but also in an 
attempt to flout the political taboo that surrounded funded pensions in France in the 
early nineties, insurers pushed for the creation of the first sector-level funded DC 
scheme in France. Despite being delayed by the trade unions’ opposition to the 
project73 and by uncertainty concerning legislation on pension funds74, the scheme 
was set up in 1999. The insurers’ pension fund is financed by employer contributions 
set at 1% of gross wage, which continue to be paid in case of illness or maternity. 
The scheme is managed by a consortium of insurance companies – the BCAC75 – 
which is supervised by a bipartite board. Although firms were given the possibility to 
opt out of the scheme if they were willing to set up a more advantageous one, most 
companies of the sector decided to join it, including state-owned companies that 
were privatised at the beginning of the nineties76. As a result, the insurers’ pension 
plan covers a large majority of insurance companies’ employees on condition that 
they fulfil the seniority criteria (See appendix 1). 
After the industry-level fund was officially launched, companies started to create 
their own firm-level pension schemes. In 1999, Axa instituted two new pension plans 
for all its employees: one art. 83 plan and one art. 39 plan (see appendix 1). The art. 
Naczyk, Palier: Complementing or replacing old age insurance?        31 
 
83 DC plan is financed by employer as well as by employee contributions. 
Contributions start to be paid once the worker has been employed for 12 months. 
The art. 39 DB plan is an “additive” scheme and offers 4% of the average gross 
salary of the 5 years preceding retirement. This scheme is offered only to employees 
who have a length of service of at least 15 years and who are employed by the 
company at retirement. A PERCO plan has been added in 2005. Similar 
developments have been witnessed at AGF. This company, which was state-owned 
until 1996 and had as a consequence a separate occupational DB plan, closed its 
“retraite chapeau” in the mid-nineties and joined the newly created industry-level DC 
plan. However, in July 2005, a collective agreement was signed with trade unions in 
order to create a supplementary company pension plan. One tier is offered by a 
compulsory DC scheme (art. 83) financed by employee contributions (1%) as well 
employer contributions (2%). The funds are managed by AGF Asset Management. 
The second tier of AGF’s supplementary pension plan is constituted by a PERCO. 
AGF is also remarkable in that it closed the art. 39 DB pension scheme that catered 
for its senior executive staff in 200577, that is at a time when the company was being 
absorbed by Allianz group. 
 
Supplementary pensions in the banking sector 
After the Second World War, supplementary pensions in the banking sector 
were not integrated with the ARRCO/AGIRC system, despite the fact that they were 
financed on a PAYG basis. Banks offered a DB “chapeau” pension, with benefits 
calculated on the basis of the wage at retirement. The system was managed by 14 
independent firm-level pension institutions as well as by a multi-employer one78 
whose risk pools differed very widely from each other. However, from the mid-
1980s, the number of pensioners increased very sharply in the sector, as companies 
had hired new employees on a very large scale during the 1960s and the 1970s. The 
demographic imbalances in the industry were projected to worsen during the 
following years. As a result, the social partners negotiated a reform of the system 
through a collective agreement signed in 1993. In order to assure the financial 
sustainability of pensions in the sector, they decided to incorporate the company 
schemes into the ARRCO/AGIRC framework. However, it was also decided that 
the differential between the pension offered by standard private sector schemes and 
the banking sector scheme79 would not continue to be provided to new entrants to 
the industry.  
A “banking top-up” (complément bancaire), financed by employer contributions, 
was granted to all existing pensioners as well as to all the people who had been 
employed in the banking sector for at least 15 years at the time the collective 
agreement was signed. This pension supplement, whose level is nevertheless lower 
than it used to be due to ungenerous indexation (Les Echos, 2004), is financed by 
what remains of the firm-level pension institutions that managed the banking 
supplementary schemes. These institutions have been de facto transformed into 
managers of art. 39 schemes80 and, by the same token, they have been forced to 
accumulate sufficient assets to cover current and future liabilities. For instance, at 
BNP Paribas, the former “Caisse de retraite BNP” closed in 2006 and all remaining 
liabilities are financed through the company’s book reserves, while liabilities of the 
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“Caisse de retraite Paribas” are covered through a group insurance agreement signed 
in 2007. However, in order to partly counterbalance the loss of retirement income 
incurred by younger and new bank employees, many banks (including HSBC France 
or Banques Populaires) have set up mandatory defined-contribution schemes that 
cover most workers in the companies. At Société Générale, an art. 83 plan has been 
established through a collective agreement signed in 1995 (Palsky, 1997). The scheme 
is managed by an ad hoc provident institution81 that is supervised by a bipartite board. 
Employee contributions are set at 0.5% of gross salary82, whereas employer 
contributions are set at about 1%. In 2006, 46,300 active workers were contributing 
to the scheme, while 7,300 pensioners were already drawing benefits (Société 
Générale, 2007, p. 14). BNP Paribas has also been offering an art. 83 DC scheme 
since 1997. The contribution rate is are set at 1% of the reference wage which is 
calculated up to a maximum of 110% of the social security ceiling. The plan which is 
managed by Malakoff Médéric, a provident institution, has been transformed into a 
PERE (see section 4.3 of this chapter) in 2006, thus allowing employees to pay 
voluntary contributions on top of the compulsory ones.  Since the Fillon reform, 
both BNP Paribas and Société Générale have also set up PERCOs whose funds are 
managed by the banks themselves.  
 
 
The outlook for the French pension system 
 
Funded pensions have traditionally been a delicate question in French politics. In 
official rhetoric, politicians have emphasised their commitment to maintain pay-as-
you-go financing of pensions as a central part of the social contract. However, by 
successfully framing reforms as attempts to ‘consolidate’ the existing pension and 
thanks to a skilful sequencing of reforms, successive governments have been able to 
modify the system in such a way that the balance is tilting towards a greater use of 
funded pensions. The numerous increases in the length of contribution that is 
required to get a full statutory pension promote a tighter link between contributions 
and benefits, and will result in a very probable decrease in benefit levels in the future 
(COR, 2006, 2007a). This trend is reinforced by the changes that have been made by 
the social partners in the indexation of ARRCO and AGIRC benefits. The 2003 
Fillon reform has given clear signals that policy-makers expect that younger workers 
will increasingly put money in voluntary retirement savings plans. One such signal is 
sent by the creation of the PERP and the PERCO. A second signal is made by the 
introduction of a “right to information” that aims at allowing workers to make 
informed decisions about their retirement. Since July 2007, different age cohorts have 
been regularly receiving information sheets which show the pension rights they have 
accrued in the different compulsory pension schemes as well as simulations of their 
future benefits. 
Since 2006, the reform agenda has been increasingly shifting towards the 
promotion of longer working lives among elderly workers. A series of measures have 
been taken to decrease the role played by public and private early retirement 
programmes. Incentives to work longer are also being extended. However, as France 
continues to have very low employment rates among this category of the population, 
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the idea of increasing the retirement age has become increasingly popular within 
France’s main employer association, MEDEF. This organisation argues that, in order 
to raise employment rates among the elderly, it is necessary not only to curb the use 
of early retirement programmes or to increase the contribution length, but also to 
raise the legal retirement age from 60 years to 62 or even 63.5. MEDEF argues that 
such a measure would have an unequivocally positive effect on employment rates 
among the elderly, as it would change workers’ and companies’ expectations and thus 
provide an incentive for companies to invest more in elderly workers. The 
employers’ association officially asked for an increase in the age from which a full 
pension can be drawn, during the 2009 ARRCO and AGIRC negotiation, but the 
trade unions opposed the demand. However, the issue was raised again during the 
2010 negotiation on a reform of statutory pension schemes and a rise in the 
retirement age seemed to receive increasing support from the right-wing Fillon 
government. 
In the future, the agenda should also focus on the pension rights of the 
increasingly numerous ‘atypical’ workers. The French labour market is characterised 
by a considerable degree of dualisation, with some workers enjoying high 
employment protection and good salaries, while others are cornered in sectors 
marked by high job instability and low levels of pay. This situation means that a wide 
group of workers are at a double disadvantage in terms of access to adequate 
pensions. First, job instability affects workers’ contribution records and therefore the 
benefit levels that they can expect from the statutory and ARRCO-AGIRC schemes. 
Second, it also affects workers’ access to private pension benefits, which are 
supposed to compensate for diminished replacement rates in public schemes. 
Workers employed on fixed-term contracts or in unstable jobs are not covered by 
employer-sponsored pension schemes, as they cannot reach the minimum length of 
service that is required to benefit from firm-level plans. Moreover, even if they are 
properly informed about their future benefit levels, they may not have the capacity to 
save themselves for their pension. Such workers may in fact prefer to ensure that 
their savings are liquid enough, so that they can use them in case of unemployment. 
This also raises the question of the appropriateness of a strategy based on the 
promotion of voluntary pension savings as the main compensation for the decrease 
in public pensions. If inequalities in terms of access to funded pensions are to be 
decreased, more emphasis should be put on the promotion of more encompassing 
occupational schemes. The traditionally conflict-ridden relationship between French 
social partners and the weakness of unions’ organisational capacities at the enterprise 
level do not currently provide fertile ground for the expansion of mandatory funded 
occupational schemes. Therefore, a widening of coverage by occupational pensions 
will depend on the way the industrial relations system will evolve in coming years. 
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2
 minimum-vieillesse and, since 2007, allocation de solidarité aux personnes âgées 
 
3
 After the Second World War, representatives of a new type of middle-class – i.e. management staff in 
private companies (the ‘cadres’) were discontented with their incorporation into the régime general. This 
occupational category was able to negotiate through a collective agreement the establishment of a 
supplementary PAYG pension scheme based on the points technique which would top up their statutory 
benefits (Boltanski, 1982; Friot, 1994; Reynaud, 1997). The AGIRC, which supervises and clears the 
participating pension funds and mutual aid societies, was thus founded in 1947. From 1956, different 
companies and sectors created similar supplementary PAYG points schemes for other categories of 
employees and workers. In order to strengthen coordination between these multiple schemes and to improve 
coverage, the social partners established national federations inspired from the AGIRC: the UNIRS3 in 1957 
and the ARRCO in 1961. The latter collective agreement was extended by the state to all sectors encompassed 
by the main employers’ association (CNPF) in 1962. In 1972, the state made participation to the ARRCO and 
AGIRC schemes compulsory for all firms. 
 
4
 The contribution period has been increased from from 37.5 to 40 years in the civil servants’ pensions 
schemes (Régime des Agents de l’Etat and CNRACL), by the 2003 Fillon reform. The contribution period will 
be increased to 40 years in other public sector schemes, if the recent reform of régimes spéciaux is effectively 
implemented. 
 
5
 1.7 million people at the end of 2005 (compared to 1.2 million at the end of 2004, i.e. a 35% growth rate in 
one year) according to a study carried out by the DREES (2007). 
 
6
 If we analyze changes in the composition of the assets held by French households, we see that the part 
played by savings intended for retirement (life insurance and retirement pension savings proper) increased 
during the 1990s. While only 31% of French households had such assets in 1986, 46.6% did in 2000 (INSEE, 
2001, Tableaux de l’économie française, p. 119). 
 
7
  Fonds de solidarité vieillesse (FSV) 
 
8
 The civil servants’ new scheme has been named Retraite Additionnelle de la Fonction Publique and is 
administered by the state. The farmers’ supplementary pension scheme is managed by the Mutualité Sociale 
Agricole, while the second pillar for the self-employed is managed by the Régime social des indépendants 
(See Table X.1). All these schemes are financed by contributions. 
 
9
 Institution de Retraite Complémentaire des Agents Non Titulaires de l'État et des Collectivités Publiques 
 
10
 The pension benefit P is equal to the number of pension points acquired during the working period 
multiplied by the “pension point value” PV. Pension points are calculated by multiplying the reference wage 
W by the contribution rate CR and by dividing these two elements by a “price of the point” PP whose value is 
changed regularly by AGIRC and ARRCO. The full pension is obtained at age 60, but benefits can be drawn 
from age 55 by applying a “reduction coefficient” RC, which depends on the retirement age and the total 
contribution period. The benefit formula can thus be represented as follows (See Bozio, 2006, p. 69 and 
Legros, 2006, pp. 205-206): 
 
( )
period)oncontributiRC(age,*PV*
PP
CR*W
P 





∑=  
 
11
 In the ARRCO scheme, the surviving spouse receives a pension that is equal to 60% of the pension 
received by the deceased beneficiary. The surviving spouse must be at least 55 years old unless he or she has 
two children in his or her care or he or she is disabled. Orphaned children can have a allowance that is 
calculated on the basis of 50% of the points earned (Dupeyroux et al., 2005, p. 1068). In the AGIRC scheme, 
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the surviving spouse receives a pension that can vary between 52% and 60% of the pension received by the 
deceased beneficiary. The surviving spouse must be at least 60 years old unless he or she has two children in 
his or her care or he or she is disabled. Orphaned children can have a allowance that is calculated on the basis 
of 30% of the points earned (Dupeyroux et al., 2005, p. 1073). 
 
12
 Beneficiaries having pension entitlements from derived rights (such as survivors’ benefits, etc) are not 
included. 
 
13
 However, it should be noted that 94% of AGIRC beneficiaries were men (DREES, 2008b). 
 
14
 For a detailed presentation of assumptions, see COR, 2006, pp. 277-279 
 
15
 Thus, in total, 83.6% of the last wage. 
 
16
 Thus, in total, 64.1% of the last wage. 
 
17
 i.e. management staff in private sector firms. 
 
18
 ‘Cadres’ were not affiliated with ARRCO before 1973. 
 
19
 i.e. set up through collective agreements and managed by representatives of employers and employees.  
 
20
 Even though the scheme continued to be managed by a multiplicity of different pension institutions. 
 
21
 ‘Groupes paritaires’ 
 
22
 Guillaume Sarkozy – chief representative of Médéric and former vice-president of MEDEF, France’s main  
employers’ association – quoted in La Tribune de L’Assurance (2007) 
 
23
 institutions de prévoyance 
 
24
 Although from a legal point of view, ‘paritarian’ institutions (institutions de retraite complémentaire) and 
provident institutions (institutions de prévoyance) are regarded as two separate entities, they continue to 
coexist within the same private ‘paritarian’ social protection groups (such as Malakoff-Médéric, Novalis, etc.) 
whose specificity lies in the fact that they are supervised by the social partners.  
 
25
 Complément de Retraite de la Fonction Publique – Civil Service Retirement Supplement 
 
26
 Complément Retraite des Hospitaliers – Hospital Staff Retirement Supplement 
 
27
 Caisse Nationale de Prévoyance de la Fonction Publique - National Civil Service Provident Society 
 
28
 Fonds de Pension des Elus Locaux - Locally Elected Politicians’ Pension Fund 
 
29
 Caisse Autonome de Retraite des Elus Locaux – Locally Elected Politicians’ Autonomous Pension 
Institution 
 
30
 When it was set up for farmers in 1990, COREVA was managed by the Mutualité sociale agricole (MSA), 
which is also responsible for the farmers’ statutory pension. Due to complaints about the de facto monopoly 
enjoyed by the MSA, the scheme was proscribed in 1995 by the ECJ and the market was subsequently 
opened to insurance companies. 
 
31
 Code Général des Impôts – General Tax Code 
 
32
 Plan d’Epargne Retraite Collective – Collective Retirement Savings Plans 
 
33
 Plans d’épargne retraite populaire – Popular Retirement Savings Plans 
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 No data are currently available on total coverage by these schemes, as companies often refuse to divulge 
information that is considered as strictly confidential, given its strategic importance in HR strategy. However, 
a recent survey carried out by Hewitt Associates shows that DB schemes are offered to a very limited number 
of employees, as 77% of companies offered them to fewer than 250 employees.  
(See 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/docs/social_protection/2007/ec_report_final_nov_2007_en.pdf p. 
58) 
 
35
 13% of people working in companies employing 1000 workers or more had access to a PERCO plan in 
2006 (DARES 2008, p. 2). 
 
36
 Less than 3% of people working in companies employing less than 250 workers were covered by a PERCO 
in 2006 (DARES 2008, p. 2). 
 
37
 Those having less than 10 employees. 
 
38
 The level of participation to PERCOs seems to partly correlate with the generosity of employer matching 
contributions. For example, in 2005, 72.5% of employees put savings in a PERCO at Sanofi Synthelabo – 
where employer matching contributions were set at 150%, while only 19% of workers employed by L’Oréal 
participated in their PERCO, as employer matching contributions were set at only 50% (Les Echos 2005). 
 
39
 Subscribers to PERP are also younger than those to other individual pensions. More than 16% of 
individuals that contribute to a PERP a less than 30 years old, compared to 9% of subscribers to PERCO and 
4% of those who contribute to Madelin contracts or to a voluntary public sector scheme. 44% of new 
subscribers to PERCO are in fact aged 50 or more, which means that this product attracts an older population. 
 
40
 These figures do not include pension expenditures financed through book reserves. 11% of funded benefits 
were paid as part of DC schemes for the self-employed (Madelin contracts) or for farmers (exploitants 
agricoles contracts). 12% were paid as part of voluntary public-sector DC scheme (PREFON, CREF, 
COREM, FONPEL, etc.) and 77% were paid as part of a company-sponsored pension plan (DREES, 2008a).. 
 
41
 This replacement rate may be a function of the employee’s length of service in the company. 
 
42
 Dexia Annual Report 2007, p. 46  
 
43
 France Telecom Annual Financial Report 2007, p. 197 
 
44
 In recent years, the “retraites chapeaux” received by CEOs or other senior managers have provoked uproar 
in the media. The biggest scandal broke when it was revealed, in February 2005, that Daniel Bernard – 
Carrefour’s recently CEO – would get a “retraite-chapeau” with a replacement rate of 40% of his last salary 
and that the company had covered the liabilities with 29 million euros on its book reserves. 
 
45
 Public sector voluntary DC schemes (PREFON, COREM, CRH, etc.) use the point technique and thus have 
a slightly different mode of functioning (see part 6.5). 
 
46
 Lump-sum payments are allowed in case of low benefit levels. 
 
47
 The only exception used to be the CREF which was only partially funded, but, since 2002, the newly 
created COREM is entirely funded (see part 6.5). 
 
48
 Loi Evin du 8 août 1994 
 
49
 Indeed, no tax relief is available for plans financed by book reserves and companies have to pay higher 
social contribution rates on them. 
 
50
 Contributions rates can be set at different levels according to different wage brackets or the seniority of the 
employee in the company. Such a differentiation may serve as an HR tool to improve staff retention. 
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51
 In 2006, the average annual individual contribution was estimated at 530 euros for contributions to PERP 
and at 1920 euros for contributions to PERCO (employer matching represented approximately one fourth of 
that sum). 
 
52
 Two types of profit-sharing schemes are available in France. Participation is compulsory in companies that 
employ 50 people or more and has been introduced in 1967. Intéressement is optional and was created in 
1959. 
 
53
 “Working time savings accounts” allow workers to opt out from working time reduction policies and to 
earn wages increased by 25% for the foregone free time. 
 
54
 i.e. 5324 EUR in 2008. 
 
55
 art. 39, art. 83 and PERCO altogether 
 
56
 i.e. 1,664 euros in 2008 
 
57
 Caisses d’Epargne, which have transformed their DB plan into a provident institution (institution de  
prévoyance) administered by a bipartite board, are an exception to the rule (Les Echos, 2008).  
 
58
 Organismes de placement collectif en valeurs mobilière 
 
59
 Groupement d’épargne retraite populaire 
 
60
 Two years before retirement age, at least 90% of the invested savings must be guaranteed by the pension 
manager. Between the two and the five years preceding retirement, at least 80% must be guaranteed, between 
the five and the ten years that precede retirement, at least 65% must be guaranteed, etc 
 
61
 Commission de contrôle des mutuelles et des institutions de prévoyance – loi Evin du 31 décembre 1989 
 
62
 Autorité de Contrôle des Assurances et des Mutuelles 
 
63
 Fonds de garantie des assurés contre la défaillance de sociétés d'assurance de personne 
 
64
 Fonds paritaire de garantie des institutions de prévoyance 
 
65
 Fédération nationale de la Mutualité française 
 
66
 Système Fédéral de Garantie de la FNMF 
 
67
 The insurance-sector pension scheme originated in fact from the companies’ multiple occupational schemes 
that had been created in 1937-1938. 
 
68
 Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurances 
 
69
 3 billion French francs 
 
70
 11 billion French francs 
 
71
 Société d'Assurance de Consolidation des Retraites de l'Assurance 
 
72
 i.e. the CREPPSA (Caisse de retraite et de prévoyance du personnel des sociétés d’assurances) 
 
73
 CGT, FO, CFTC and part of CGC opposed the projet and tried to block its implementation by going to 
court. CFDT was the only union that did not try to obstruct the creation of the scheme. 
 
74
 The Juppé government was at the time planning the introduction of funded pension schemes, and the sector 
was forced to wait until things were clarified. 
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75
 Bureau Commun d’Assurances Collectives (which also provides supplementary health insurance contracts 
for employees of the insurance sector) 
 
76
 Particularly UAP and AGF, which, as a result of their nationalised status, ran firm-level DB pension 
schemes that were separate from the private-sector insurers’ plan and closed them at the end of the nineties 
(Caisse de Retraite du Personnel de l’Union des Assurances de Paris as well as Caisse de retraite du 
Personnel des AGF). UAP’s “chapeau” scheme offered supplementary benefits set at 2% per year of service 
with a maximum replacement rate of 70% of the reference salary calculated on the basis of the last three years 
preceding retirement.  
 
77
 AGF Annual Financial Report 2006, p. 25 
 
78
 The Caisse de Retraite de la Profession Bancaire (CRPB), which was responsible for managing small 
banks’ as well as foreign banks’ supplementary pension schemes. 
 
79
 Benefits in the banking sector were on average 15% higher than in wage-earner schemes. 
 
80
 More precisely, institutions de retraite supplémentaire. 
 
81
 The “Institution de Prévoyance Valmy” 
 
82
 up to 2 social security ceilings since 2006 (used to be 4 social security ceilings). 
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